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.AMERICAN IlNESTMENTS AND INDUSTRIAL 
COI-l'CENTRATIOii IN EUROPE* 
l. The growth of firms. To analyze the problem in a meaningful way, it is 
useful to treat the many issues involved separately. Reversing the order 
suggested in the title, I will first consider briefly, the modern theory of 
the firm, its growth and development; secondly, I will examine the problem 
of industrial concentration and finally, some observations on the relation­
ship between American investments in Europe and European industrial concen­
tration will be presented. 
In recent years, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the 
neoclassical theory of the firm which has as its goal the maximization or 
its profit, subject to a number of constraints. Such a theory is rather 
poor in explaining phenomena with which the firm is confronted. In fact 
it has been observed that management adopts policies other than protit 
maximization. 
One variant of the noeuvelle theory or the firm, in its most complete 
representation, is that discussed by Marris.
1 In short, it says that t~ 
problems confronting a modern corporation are: the creation of a growing 
demand for its products and the provision ot financial capital to allow 
the necessary growth of its productive capacity. The firm will try to 
realize the maximum prof.it; however, the search for or creation of new 
* . 
This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Society for 
Advancement of Management and to the Management Department of State Uni­
versity of New York in March, 1969. I would like to thank Alan Kirman, 
Richard Nelson, Stephen Resnick 9 and James Tobin for many useful comments. 
Of course; they are absolved from any responsibility for any defects tb&t 
remain. 
l . .Cfr. Marris., R. 9 The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, 
New York 1964. 
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markets costs money. Therefore, as the growth process is accelerate, the 
average return on the total assets of the corporation declines. On the other 
hand, the increase in sales requires an increase in its productive capacity 
and hence demands an adequate supply of financial capital. 
If the main source of finance is internal, the rate of profit plays a 
strategic role in determining the available finance. In turn the rate of 
growth influences and is influenced by the rate of profit. If we assume the 
retained gains are the only source of finance and if the proportion of total 
earnings retained is fixed, then for a given corporation there would be only 
one rate of growth which could satisfy both conditions simultaneously, i.e., 
an equilibrium between growth rate and profit rate. 
The profit rate in this model is low enough to permit the growth of 
sales and high enough to supply the firm with financial capital. The manage­
ment having formulated its growth rate goal must then choose the correspond­
ing retention ratio. If it does not behave in this way, it will run out of 
money or will miss the proposed target. Managers may not consider all these 
complications, but there is some evidence that they view the structure of 
the problem in this way. Moreover, once the growth rate target and the reten­
tion ratio has been chosen, it is possible to determine the optimal (unique) 
expected growth rate of the dividend to be paid. Stockholders can sacrifice 
present dividends for future capital gains up to a certain point. A growth 
rate chosen by the management which 11goes 11 beyond this point will have the 
effect of depressing the stock price. This last proposition allows us to 
compare the neoclassical version with the 11new11 theory of the firm. The 
former assumes as a managerial objective the maximization of the price of 
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stock; the latter the maximization of growth subject to a minimum on stock 
prices. 
2. Mergers and industrial concentration. One way to secure a continuous 
growth for a corporation is provided by mergers and amalgamation with other 
corporations. The incentives to merge are numerous such as: surplus capa­
city, damping out changes in demand, expansion of the range of product lines, 
increase in the geographical areas of operations, spread of ugoodwill," 
introduction.of new techniques into rather stagnant industries and forth.so 
A problem of strategic importance is to determine the degree of con­
centration2 or, in other words, the problem of assessing the monopoly power 
of corporations within an industry. It is worth mentioning at this point 
that this latter can be offset by a number of factors on the demand side of 
the market such as possible future competition from new products and counter­
vailing power of the consumers, although this latter is as yet undeveloped. 
The factors which contribute to the maintenance of high concentration 
are numerous. The literature on this subject is very large and the problem 
cannot be examined in detail here. However, it is interesting to list a 
few of these factors such as: a) the state of the industry activity, b) the 
economics of large-scale operation, c) capital requirements, d) patents and 
technical "know-how, 11 e) access to raw materials, f) state regulations (anti­
trust policies in particular, g) advertising and sales promotion. 
2
Different indexes of industrial concentration have been proposed. The 
most important contributions are associated with the names of Lerner (1933),
Adelman (1951), Chamberlin (1954), Rosenbluth (1957), Kaysen (1959),
Scitovsky (1959), Bain (1966). The problem is somewhat complex and cannot 
be investigaged here. 
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When we try to compare degrees of industrial concentration in a given coun­
try, over a certain period of time, we have obviously to take into account the 
change in these factors, especially when we try to compare industrial concen­
tration of different countries. Here the problem is aggravated by the differ­
ences which we encounter in the definition of an industry which if not taken 
into account can invalidate the results obtained. 
The difficulties to which we have referred make the problem of formulating 
international comparisons of the degree of concentration very difficult. None­
theless, some studies have been made. In spite of their obvious shortcomings, 
it will be useful to present some results to shed light on the overall problem. 
None of these studies have compared the United Kingdom with the United 
States basically because of the problem of availability of statistical data. 
For example, Evely and Little3 (1960) examined a nwnber of industries for the 
U.K. in 1935 and 1951, They employed three different concentration ratios, the 
share of gross output, net output and employment represented by the three 
largest business units. They classified as highly concentrated those indus-
tries which had 67 percent and over of the market size, medium as 33,6 percent 
and low as 33 percent and under. For the main, however, they used the employ­
ment ratio supplementing it with other indicators. For 1951, of a total of 
220 industries, 50 were found to be highly concentrated, 69 of medium concen­
4tration and 101 of low concentration. 
3cfr. Evely R. and Little, I.M.D., Concentration in British Industry 
(Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
4c1assifying according to industrial groups, we have chemicals et similia 
50 percent, electrical engineering et similia 48 percent, vehicles 41 percent, 
woolens and worsted 18 percent, clothing and footwear 14 percent, building, 
Although there are other industries for which statistical data were 
unavailable, the ones exatnined give a fair representation of the English 
economy over the period considered. It was often noted that those corpora­
tions which had the highest growth rate contributed to a higher degree of 
concentration. Many of them were subsidiaries of American corporations or, 
in a few cases, of European corporations or English firms which had access 
to new technical know-how of foreign firms which were leading companies in 
their respective countries. Other studies show that the concentration 
ratios in the U.K. tend to be higher than those of U.S. 
3. Industrial concentration in some European countries. Some studies 
concerning the assessment of industrial concentration have been done for a 
relatively small group of other countries. Here I will briefly summarize 
some of them paying particular attention to those concerning Europe. 
The results of an inquiry into comparative degrees of concentration 
in West Germany industry, shows a tendency toward an increasing of concen­
tration in the period 1954-60. {See Table 1.) 
The study reveals that in the majority of industrial groups the share 
of the 10 largest firms has increased. While in 1954 a group of 50 firms 
Footnote 4 continued from previous page: 
51 percent, electrical engineering et similia 48 percent, vehicles 41 per­
cent, woolens and worsted 18 percent, clothing and footwear 14 percent, 
building, contracting and civil engineering 12 percent. The industries in 
which concentration increased over the period 1935-51 are: coke owners 
and by-products, razors, mineral oil refining, watches and clocks, metal­
liferous mines and quarries, lead, building bricks, metal boxes and con­
tainers, tinplate, cinematograph, sugar glucose, wrought iron and steel 
tubes, bread and flour, soap, Concentration decreased in the following in­
dustries: polishes and canvasdressings, wallpaper, biscuits, linoleum and 
leathercloth, grain milling, matches. 
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Table 1 
COMPARATIVE DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION IN WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY 
BY SELECTED INDUSTRY GROUPS 
Industrial Groups 













Precision, optical and watch industry 
Synthetics 
Steel 










The 10 Largest Enterprises 
Change of Turn­Have ... Percent of the 
over Share.Total TurnoverRanking 1960 as Against 
1960 1954 1960 1954 in Percent 
1 72.6 91.5 +26.0 
2 68.8 84.5 +22.8 
3 71.5 69.0 - 3.5 
4 58.6 67.0 +14.3 
5 60.7 59.7 ... 1.6 
6 45.7 51.7 +13,l 
7 44.o 44.7 + 1.6 
8 34.6 42.0 +21.4 
9 38,5 41.5 + 7,8 
10 37 ,5 4o.6 + 8.3 
11 37.8 38.4 + 1.6 
12 28.5 37.5 +31.6 
13 36. 5 37,3 + 2.2 
14 25,3 25.2 - o.4 
15 27.9 20.5 =26~5 
16 25.6 20.2 -21.1 
17 21.3 19.9 - 6.6 
18 16.4 17.9 + 9.1 
19 12.2 17.5 +43.4 
20 14.6 13.4 - 8.2 
21 11.5 13.4 +16.5 
22 11.7 12.0 + 2.6 
23 9,7 11.9 +22.7 
24 6.5 7,4 +13,8 
25 6.6 7,3 +10.6 
Source: Concentration in the Federal Republic of Germany; Cartel, 1964, 
Vol. XIV,No. 4, p, 170. 
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accounted for 17.7 percent of industrial production, the same group accounted 
for 22,8 percent in 1960. A higher degree of concentration in 1960 than in 
1954 was found in banking and insurance companies. 
The report emphasizes the different causes of concentration for differ­
ent economic sectors. It is a.rgued--contrary to the most widespread opinion-­
that technological factors as an incentive to concentration play a minor role 
in most sectors while the major cause seems to be the financial and managerial 
capacities available to large enterprises. Strangely enough, concentration 
is reported to have been stimulated by company law and tax and patent legis­
lation. This last proposition evidences the importance of legislation in the 
maintenance of a "fair competitive" system. 
Bain5 has recently produced some evidence on the difference in indus­
trial concentration for 8 countries : U.S. , U. K. , Sweden, Canada, France, 
Japan, Italy, and India. As we are interested only in European countries, 
we will confine our attention to the figures for these. Out of a total of 
34 industries France has a 20-plant concentration (i.e., the percentage of 
industry employment accounted for by the largest 20 plants in each industry 
in each country) equal or higher than the U.S. in 22 industries, Italy in 
27 1 Sweden in 27, United Kingdom in 21 (see Table 2). The industries in 
which all the four countries have a degree of plant concentration higher 
than the U.S. are: plastics, tobacco products, petroleum refining, rubber, 
cement, paper and paperboard, canned and preserved fruits, vegetables, 
knitting mills, sawmills and planing mills. 
The number of plants needed to account for 50 percent of industry 
employment (see Table 3) is larger in the U.S. than in France, Sweden, 
5cfr. Bain, J.S., International Differences in Industrial Structure, 
Yale University Press, 1966. 
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Table 2 
COMPARATIVE TWENTY-PLANT CONCENTRATION IN THIRTY-FOUR INDUSTRIES
IN FIVE COUNTRIES, AS MEASURED IN TERMS OF RELATIVES TO




Industries States France Italy Sweden Kingdom
High to moderate plant concentration 
Explosives 100 76 100 116(13) 94Electric light btilbs 100 114 111 n.a.** 77Plastics 100 n.a. 125 108 120Distilled liquor 100 62 31 101 95Sugar refining 100 86 108 185(16) 145Shipbuilding ido 129 188 186 75Drugs 100 46 83 2ii(18) 104Steel works and rolling mills 100 125 153 189 85Agricultural machinery 100 106 109 n.a. n.a.Aircraft 100 127 230 n.a. 100Nonferrous metals 100 153 148 233(18) 86
Tobacco products 100 218 113. 234( 8) 181
Petroleum refining 100 218 210 234(5) 234(18)Bi'eweries 100 20472 107 66
Soap 100 176 63 198 207Motor vehicle~ and parts 100 160 230 n.a. 102
Rubber products 100 176 224 294 142 
Moderate to low plant concentration 
Pulp mills 100 152 n.a. 192 n.a.
Hardware 100 89 115 n.a. 49Glass products 100 87 105 227 178
Seafood (canned, preserved, cured) 100 78 210 229 156Cement 100 133 111 398(8) 248
Leather tanning 100 112 127 380 91Wool textiles 100 88 124 301 50
Cotton textiles 100 n.a. 124 n.a. 67Paper and paperboard 100 170 192 285 161
Paints and varnishes 100 154 198 400 193Canned and preserved fruits, vegetables 100 131 115 249 209
Wood containers 100 n.a. 100 514 118
Grain products 100 178 55 876 282
Knitting mills 100 172 120 470 175Electrical industrial machinery 100 305 n.a. n.a. 323
Sawmills and planing mills 100 108 197 370 157Apparel 100 135 86 722 227 
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Table 2 (continued) 
* Where the number of plants in an industry is less than 20, the actual ~umber 
is shown in parentheses, and the concentration relative refers to the ratio 
of 100 percent (controlled by the actual number of plants) to the correspond­
ing percentage of United States employment in the industry controlled by the 
largest 20 plants. 
**Not available. 
Source: Bain, 2£.· cit., pp. 44-45. 
-10-
Table 3 
NUMBER OF LARGEST PLANTS ACCOUNTING FOR 50 PERCENT OF 
INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT, FOR TWENTY-FOUR INDUSTRIES 
IN FIVE COUNTRIES 
Number of Plants to Account for 50 Percent 
Industries 
_L . , I















Seafood (canned, preserved, cured) 
Wool textiles 
Paper and paperboard 
Grain products 

























Canned and preserved fruits~ vegetables 182 
Knitting mills 292 
Sawmills, planing mills 1,072 
*Not available. 
Source: Bain, op. cit., pp. 52-53, 
of Ihdust~l ,Ernfloyment 
United King-
France Italy Swedxn dom 
7 5 n.S..* 17 
13 l 2 11 
n.a. 4 9 9 
36 125 9 14 
25 22 5 12 
11 5 4 31 
8 3 1 4 
93 33 3 21 
46 8 26 67 
16 7 6 29 
17 1 6 20 
9 107 6 6 
13 n.a. 16 n.a. 
37 51 3 16 
69 52 4 74 
64 16 16 47 
106 61 11 247 
37 33 16 31 
237 3,236 5 53 
57 20 8 36 
n.a. 718 9 130 
71 40 26 94 
127 327 23 117 
939 525 121 401 
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United Kingdom and Italy. 
4. Industrial concentration in Italy. Let us examine the Italian case in 
more detail. According to the findings of Bain, top-level seller concentra­
tion in the Italian manufacturing industries sampled tends to be higher than 
in France, U.K. and U.S. Of 19 industries, 14 are more concentrated than the 
corresponding ones in the U.S. In particular, there are several ~ases in 
which the largest company in the industry controls a proportiori of the indus­
try roughly equal to that of the foU:i:' largest firms in the cort'esponding in­
dustry in the U.S. (passenger automobiles, sulfuric acid, plastics, watches, 
shipbuilding, cement, paper and paperboard, wool yarn). In most cases, the 
largest two or three companies in Italian industry seem to have the same 
market share of the largest eight companies in the corresponding American 
industry. This would indicate a higher degree of monopoly and oligopoly 
power in Italy. 
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the above study as the 19 
industries examined represent a small sample. Furthermore, due to the "dual 
structure" of the Italian economy, it is possible only to make some super­
ficial observations on this problem. As it is well known, Italy is one of 
the few industrial countries which does not yet have any anti-trust legis­
lation. Cartelization is rather widespread in industries such as chemicals, 
steel, textiles, foodstuff, cellulose, paper, glass, metallurgic products 
and machinery and equipment made of metal. If we consider this list, it is 
obvious that these firms represent a large and important part of the whole 
national product of Italy. The fact that some of these industries are 
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"controlled" by the state (wholly owned or controlled companies
6) does not 
significantly change the picture since it is not clear whether state con­
trolled enterprises produce an antimonopolistic effect. 
Quoting from Bain, "Whether or not or to what extent the presence of 
nondominant government firms in numerous industries alters the sort of com­
petition and market performance which would otherwise emerge from the ob­
served patterns of seller concentration is not clear ,nor is it clear whether 
the government uses its fi:1:·ms in the numerous industries in question to 
influence or control pricing, output~ and investment policies. The Italian 
gc>vernnient clearly has a substantial potential leverage along this line, 
but whether it does otherwise than go along with the quasi-mo:nopolistic 
policies of the concentrated oligopolies of which it is a member is not 
clear. The general character of its policy is such that it would not be 
Percentage of Output 
Supplied by Governmentally 
Industries Controlled Firms 
Shipbuilding 67 
Tractors and farm machinery 67 
Steel 38 
Motors and engines 33 
Aircraft 22 
Petroleum refining 21 
Railway rolling stock 20 
Cement 11 
Passenger Butomobiles 10 
Trucks 9 
Source: Bain, .2P.• cit., p, 100. 
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expected to employ public enterprise in manufacturing industries as a means 
of limiting private monopoly pm.fer. 11 
A different interpretation was obtained by an Italian study (Boni, 
Gross-Pietro)7 on industrial concentration for 1951 and 1961. The authors 
claim a decline in the degree of industrial concentration in 1961 as compared 
with that for 1951. !f one reinterprets their results and views the Italian 
economy as "dual" in its structure, their findings are very closely related 
with those of Bain. The degree of industrial concentration is higher in 
those sectors which use a more advanced technology and where capital require­
ments are substantial. These industries play, however, a strategic role in 
the choice of economic policies pursued by the government. 
The fact that the number of firms has increased in 1961 in a variety 
of sectors shows that conditions of free entry in the market are granted for 
firms who intend to operate in less--important sectors. This last proposi­
tion can be explained in the wider context of Italian economic growth. As 
the economy develops, the "economic structure" changes in the sense that the 
complexity of the system increases, The economy then consists of a "hard 
core" of well established industries to which entry is very difficult, sur­
rounded by a fringe of new activities undertaken by new firms. The influ­
ence of the latter on overall market conduct will clearly be very limited. 
The significant consideration is therefore not the number of new firms but 
the sector into which they enter. 
In conclusion, the European countries examined (France, Germany, Italy, 
7cfr. Boni, M. and G.M. Gross-Pietro, La Concentrazioneindustriale 
in Italia, Franco Angeli Editore, 1967. 
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Sweden, United Kingdom) show a higher degree of industrial concentration than 
in the U.S. Other European industrialized countries with an economic struc­
ture "similar" to that of the five countries for which statistics are avail­
able will, probably, have a higher degree of industrial concentration as well. 
The increase in the degree of concentration from the end of the Second 
World War until now can be explained considering a number of different fac­
tors such as: (a) the effects of the Second World War, (b) technological 
advances, (c) ec0nomic policies chosen by the different governments and, 
{d) mergers and other forms of company acquisition. 
Related with (a} is the destruction of productive capacity, shortage 
of raw materials and policy restrictions; with {b) the development and im­
provement in production techniques; with (c) tariffs and import quota poli­
cies as well as nationalization of companies operating in strategic sectors; 
with (d) a way to reduce excess capacity to make "feasible" the introduction 
of new techniques, to reduce the degree of competition (or to strengthen 
the control of industries), to decrease advertising costs as a means of sales 
promotion. 
5, The rationale of .American investments in Europe. The export of capi­
tal to finance growth and development of other countries is not something 
England in the 19th century initiated this policy obtaining as a re­new. 
ward, first place in the hierarchy of the industrialized countries for quite 
some time. As we will see, the export of American capital to Europe is, 
however, of a different nature. The rationale of U.S. investment abroad can 
be form~ate4 in the following way. Corporations, because of the necessity 
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to grow in addition to their own domestic potential for growth, have two 
paths open to them: merge with some other company and/or invest more pro­
fitably abroad, i.e., at a higher rate of return on capital as compared to 
the U.S. market. 
The first method has been widely used particularly in this last de­
cade. Statistics suggest that America is presented with the largest "wave" 
of mergers it has ever had. 8 Although this question has been extensively 
investigated, there does not seem to exist any rigorous theory which can 
explain such a phenomenon. 
It is obvious from our preceding remarks that the problem of U.S. 
investments abroad is strongly connected with the merger movement. Once 
the structure of the market in a given industry has reached some kind of 
equilibrium mergers are opposed by anti-trust legislation and by an in­
creasing opposition from public opinion. The latter develops as a result 
of misplaced faiths in the "myth of consumer sovereignty" and of perfect 
competitive forces in the market. 
In such a framework, an a1ternative is represented by the possibility 
of investing abroad. Given that the requirements for a profitable invest­
ment are numerous only a few countries which have already developed a 
highly industrialized economic infrastructure are considered as places for 
American investment. 9 
8In 1968 there were 4,462 mergers, an amount 10 times larger than 
that of 1950. 
9Recently an economist has suggested an interesting hypothesis, the 
so-called product-cycle theory. The mechanics of such a cycle is the 
following. New products in the U.S. are, in general, highly capital­
intensive, because large sums are devoted to research and development. 
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A Although the statistics on foreign investment are open to question, 
they provide us with some useful insights. The first country to attract 
U.S. investments was U.K. followed by France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Italy. The disparitJ in the amount of interest in these dif­
ferent countries is evidenced by the different totais of American invest­
ments in them, (See Table 4.) 
6. Attentative explanation. tt is useful to explore further some of the 
problems raised above. A very important one is that of investigating the 
financial sources of .American investments in Europe. The question is con­
nected with the growth and development of the Eurodollar market. This type 
of market (whose size is roughly $20 billion in net size) is made up, as it 
is well known, of foreign banking institutions which accept and invest 
balances on deposits in American banks. The existence of such a market has 
contributed to the spread of the idea that American investments in Europe 
(and not only in Europe} are, in fact, financed by European savers. It is 
hard to assess whether and to what extent such a proposition is true. Where­
ever this is the case, the poor functioning of capital markets in Europe is, 
in my opinion, to be held the major cause. 
Footnote continued from preceding page. 
Once the product becomes nstandarized" and mass production is started, .Ameri­
can enterprises lose the comparative advantage that they had with respect to 
other countries in producing these goods. At this point, it is more profit­
able for American corporations to produce these goods abroad. Acquisition of 
foreign firms or control of existing ones which are in this framework means 
to insure an extension of productive possibilities. Cfr. Vernon, R. (1966), 
International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXX:190-207. 
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Table 4 
VALUE OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENTS ABROAD 
SELECTED YEARS, 1953 - 1966 
(Millions of Dollars) 
------· Compound Annual Rate 
of Increase(%) 
Area and Countrl 1953 1958 1965 1966 1953-58 1958-66 
All areas, Total 16,329 27,355 49,328 54,563 10.8 8.0 
EEC 908 1,908 6,304 7,587 i6.o 18.8 
Belgium-Luxembourg 108 208 596 745 14.o 17.3 
France 304 546 1,609 1,158 12.4 15.7 
Germany 276 666 2,431 3,077 i9.3 f!i.5 
Italy 95 280 982 1,148 24.1 19.3 
Netherlands 125 207 686 858 10.6 19.4 
EFTA* 1,309 2,438 6,910 7,624 13.2 15.3 
Denmark 36 49 200 226 6.4 21.5 
Norway 37 53 152 167 7.5 15.4 
Sweden 74 107 315 369 7.6 16.7 
Switzerland 31 82 1,120 1,210 21.5 40.0 
United Kingdom 1,131 2,147 5,123 5,652 13.7 12.9 
All other 14,112 27,879 36,114 39,352 10.2 4.4 
*Excluding Austria and Portugal whose data are available only for 1953. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1955, 
September 1960, September 19 . 
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Another issue frequently referred to concerns the earnings of the Ameri­
can corporations. It is claimed that American corporations have in the Euro­
pean markets a variety of advantages which m~ke it possible for them to obtain 
a higher rate of profit than that obtained by European companies. The dif­
ferences in the rate of profits can be explained considering the nature and 
the characteristic of American corporations. Contrary to the European com­
panies all the American corporations investing in Europe are international 
in the sense that they operate different plants in different countries real­
izing therefore economics of different sort such as: large-scale operations, 
research and deveiopment facilities provided by parent firms in the U.S., 
easier access to firtancial capital, decteasing risks. Furthermore~ if we 
consider some socid-ebon6mic factors and the obsolete tax legislations which 
exist in some Europeah countries the diff~rences in profit rates can be 
better understood. 
Strictly tied with the previous problem, is the use of earnings of 
American corporations. At different degrees, it has been purported that 
these corporations tend to transfer their profits to the U.S., and, even­
tually, use such earnings to finance the growth of the parent corporation 
in the U.S. Also in this case, however, the issue is controversial and it 
is impossible, at the moment, to assess the exact nature of the problem. 
10The total value of direct investments in Western Europe (10 coun-
tries) was $2.2 billion in 1953, $4.3 in 1958, $12.2 in 1965 and $15.2 in 
10The preference for such countries is due to the high rate of return 
on capital American corporations in Europe as compared with the rest of 
the world. There exists evidence that rates of return are higher in Europe 
for chemicals, rubber products, food products, primary metals, electrical 
machinery as compared with those in Canada and in Latin America. 
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1966 (see Table 4.) Until 1958 EFTA countries were the main beneficiaries. 
After the creation of the EEC, the Common Market countries have increasingly 
interested American investors at the expense of the United Kingdom. This 
country has lost its supremacy in the rate of growth of American investments 
compared with many countries of Western Europe. Among these, Switzerland, 
because of special tax treatment accorded to American corporations, has in­
creased its assets from $3.1 million (1953) to $1.2 billion (1966) (see 
Table 4). It is worth noting that the Swiss trading and financial enter­
prises have, ih general, their own investments outside Switzerland and in 
particular :l.n the Common Market countries. 
If American investments are subdivided in groups (see Table 5) we find 
that investments in manufacturing and petroleum represent about 70 percent 
of the total direct investments. Investments in the former have consider­
able increased in the last six years as a consequence of acquisitions of 
European enterprises. 
Earnings of U.S. direct investments in these last years have declined 
substantially. Such decline reflects a slowdown in business expansion in 
most of the industrial countries and also a rise in foreign taxes on natural 
resource industries. 
7. Welfare implications of the U.S. investment in Europe. From another 
point of view, the role of American investments in Europe can be examined 
considering the welfare implications for the U.S. and for the European coun­
tries. Here I will briefly discuss some of these. 
The "classical" argument says tbat both the investor and the recipient 
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Table 5 
VALUE OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD BY MAJOR 
SUBGROUPS, SELECTED YEARS, 1953-66 
(millions of dollars) 
Compound Annual Rate 
of Increase { ) 
Area and Subgroup 1953 1958 1965 1966 1953-58 1958-66 
Total Direct 
Investment 16,329 27,255 49.328 54,563 10.8 9.1 
Manufacturing 5,226 8,673 19,339 22,050 10.2 12.4 
Petroleum 4,935 9,817 15,298 16,264 14.6 6.5 
Other 6,168 8,765 14,691 16,249 7.2 8.0 
EEC 908 1;908 6,304 7,587 16.0 18.8 
Manufacturing 452 970 3,725 16.5 20.5 
Petroleum 307 665 1,624 1,978 16.7 14.6 
Other 149 273 955 1,280 12.9 21.5 
IFTA* 1,309 2,438 6,910 7,624 13.2 15.3 
Manufacturing 808 1,463 3,619 4,099 12.6 13.8 
Petroleum 244 547 1,499 i,639 17.5 11.~. 7 
Other 257 428 1,192 1,886 10,7 20.5 
* Excluding Austria and Portugal. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1955 
and September 1967; U.S. Business Investment in Foreign Countries, 
Supplement to Survey of Current Business, 1960. 
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benefit from a foreign investment; the former by obtaining a higher rate of 
profit abroad, the latter from increases in labor productivity and wages. 
However, the effects of foreign investments on the national product cannot 
be examined in terms of profits and interests derived from them. Ihvest­
ments, in general, introduce new productive facilities and thus are for the 
' country where they are located a source of additional income in tehns of 
payments of wages and salaries, taxes and purchases of locally produced re­
sources. It is obvious that the extent to which these investments produce 
an increment in total incomes and tax receipts in the capital recipient 
countries will depend on the alternative opportunities for employment in 
these countries. 
In the case of Europe and in particular of the integrated area of 
EEC, a number of other effects can be spelled out. Among these the most 
important are those of increased competition and the transmission of new 
technology and technological know-how. This last can be examined by con­
sidering the relevant number of new products of Western Europe which were 
imported from the U.S. Moreover, in introducing new products and in the 
application of modern techniques, American subsidiaries have transferred 
the methods and the organization and production of some European countries. 
A different and rather complicated issue is the one of increased 
competition. It is claimed that the inflow of U.S. capital tends to in­
crease competition in industries where national corporations have a mono­
polistic or oligopolistic power. Strictly tied with this phenomenon is 
that of industrial concentration in Europe. It is very likely that the 
increase in the size of firms and the concentration process which we 
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witness in Europe has been largely determined by the necessity to withstand 
the increasing American competition. If we associate industrial concentra­
tion with increases in productivity and a better utilization of resources, 
it is e~ident that the effects of American investments arepositive. However, 
a different interpretation can be given. 
American ihvestments are, in general, in those sectors which experience 
the highest growth rate. The most efficient and concentrated national in­
dustries are also in these sectors. In such a case one would assume that 
the entry of American corporations in these sectors should increase the 
competition contributing, therefore, to an improvement in the social welfare 
of the nation. Such a proposition is, however, rather naive. In fact, it 
does not consider the nature and the role of the modern international firm, 
which, as is well known, operates through a complicated financial network 
system in such a way ~s to eliminate most of the disadvantages faced by 
national firms. An understanding of many of the "financial networks" could 
probably explain the international market structure and the existence of 
persisting oligopolistic structures as well as collusions and cartels which, 
being international, escape any form of government control. 
Looking at the U.S. side, the most widespread belief is that American 
decisions to invest abroad reduce investments in the U.S. and, therefore, 
have bearings upon the domestic growth rate, increase unemployment in the 
U.S. and worsen the balance of payments. It is difficult to assess whether 
and to what extent investments abroad affect all these variables. The prob­
lem is rather complicated and a clear answer cannot be given. For example, 
if a firm establishes a plant in a foreign country to produce goods which 
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could have been exported from the U.S. and reinvests most of its earnings in 
the foreign country, there might be adverse effects on U.S. economy. If, on 
the other hand, the investment increases exports, leads to inflow of earn­
ings and does not reduce domestic investments, then the effects are just the 
opposite. 
The most important effect of the foreign investments is the one re­
lated to the 'balance of payments. Especially since European integration, 
U.S. investments have grown considerably. This period (1958-68) corresponds 
to the increasing deficit of the U.S. balance of payments. In fact, although 
the worldwide net asset position of the U.S. was in 1967 around $51~5 billion, 
the net position with Western Europe was an excess of liabilities df nearly 
$3 billion. The reiationships between direct investments and balance of 
payments are, however, not easily observable and quantifiable. The problem 
is, therefore, open to further investigation. 
8. Summary and conclusions. It is useful to summarize the most ilnportant 
features which are relevant in the understanding of the problems we have 
tentatively analysed. 
Modern corporations have in order to "survive" to grow continuously. 
In this process two aspects are of fundamental importance: that of mergers 
and the resulting industrial concentration and that of foreign investments. 
This last is, in fact, a way to secure a continuous growth for corporations 
which are already "large" and cannot further expand without 11breaking11 anti­
trust regulations of the country in which they are based. 
American corporations have increasingly invested in Europe because of 
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the higher rate of return on ca.pita]. as compa:ted with the rest of the world. 
The choice of the sectors in which they operate is, however, rather narrow 
being concentrated in industries which experiment the highest growth 
rate such as car manufacturing, mechanics, electronics, chemicals. 
The elements which, at different degrees, have contributed to the 
establishment of American corporations in Europe are various and numerous. 
Among these, the ones that play a strategic role seem to be large scale 
dimension, technological progress, advanced entrepreneurial skill and a 
favorable system of incentives provided by many European countries. 
A number of problems have arisen as a consequence of American invest­
ments. These are related with (a) the financial sources of such investments, 
(b) the use of earnings and, (c) the worsening of the American balance of 
payments. A more important issue to be considered is, in my opinion, the 
one raised by the increasing industrial concentration in all the European 
countries which have an inflow of American investments. Such an increase 
can be explained on the ground of increasing competition produced by Ameri-­
can corporations in some European industries. This understanding can easily 
be challenged if we consider the 11dual II of such a problem, i.e. , that 
American corporations invest in sectors with a high degree of industrial 
concentration. Whether American investments produce an increase in indus­
trial concentration or whether they invest in industrial concentrated sec­
tors is, therefore, an open problem. 
It could be asked whether American investments in Europe play a 
positive or a negative role. A clear answer cannot be given as it is 
difficult to assess and to measure the "welfare11 implications for the U.S. 
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economy and for the single European countries as well. At any rate, in the 
restricted national context sucn an issue is of limited interest. What is 
more important is to assess the role that international corporations play 
in the economies of different countries, This understanding will provide 
a solid base for a more r·· gorous analysis of the pre1fious problem. 
Increasing interest among economists is devoted to the study of the 
international corporation.11 Its relevance can better be understood con­
sidering the welfare implications relative to a number of countries in 
which it operates. There are a number of problems which need to be in­
vestiaged; in particular its existence, growth, area of influence, as well 
as a number of other socio-political and cultural aspects. The issue 
which is more relevant for the 11welfare 1r of individuals in different coun-­
tries where the international firm operates is that of lack of government 
control on its operations. While, in fact, there exists in almost all 
countries an anti-trust legislation which operates--or should operate--
so as to insure the existence of competitiveness in the,_market (note that 
the notion of competitiveness changes with time); this is not the case 
for international corporations. These can, through a complicated (and 
not disclosed) financial network system escape any form of control. Fur­
thermore, it seems rational to assume that the internationalization of 
some companies has been caused, inter alia, by an increasing control from 
the government anti-trust legislations. 
In this framework it is a problem of fundamental importance to 
11The earliest contribution is that of Hymer, S.H. (1960),"The Invest­
ment Operations of Iifational Firms: A Study of Direct Investment, 11Ph.D 
thesis at M.I.T. 
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assess the welfare losses that each consumer--independently on his nation­
ality--has as a result of this growing economic power of the international 
corporation. Such an assessment will be however feasible once economists 
analyse the role that international corporations play in the economies of 
the countries in which they operate. 
